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What is Equality? The Winding
Course of Judicial Interpretation
Peter W. Hogg*
I. PURPOSE OF PAPER
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”)
came into force on April 17, 1982. However, the coming into force of
section 15 of the Charter was postponed for three years to provide time
for each government to review its body of legislation and make amendments to bring the laws into conformity with equality. Section 15 therefore came into force in 1985, which makes April 17, 2005 its 20th
anniversary. The purpose of this paper is to describe the 20-year history
of section 15 in the Supreme Court of Canada.
A related guarantee of equality is section 28 of the Charter, which
provides that the rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter “are
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.” This provision (which
has a counterpart in section 35(4), the aboriginal-rights guarantee) has
rarely been referred to in the cases. Even in the case of gender equality,
the courts have assumed that all the work is done by section 15.
Another related guarantee is section 27, which provides that the
Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” This
has also rarely been referred to, and has never played an important role
in a decision.

II. THE “EMPTY IDEA” OF EQUALITY
A guarantee of equality cannot mean that laws must treat everyone
equally. No law does that. The Criminal Code imposes punishments on
those convicted of crime; no similar burden is imposed on the innocent.
*
Peter W. Hogg, Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Scholar
in Residence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon, LLP. I am grateful to Sujit Choudhry and Shashu
Clacken, each of whom read a draft of the paper and made suggestions for improvement.
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Education Acts require children to attend school; no similar obligation is
placed on adults. Persons over 65 are entitled to public pensions; persons under 65 are not. Manufacturers of food and drugs are subject to
more stringent regulation than manufacturers of automobile parts. Every
law employs classifications of one kind or another for the imposition of
burdens or the grant of benefits. Obviously, only those classifications
that are unfair in some way would violate a guarantee of equality. But
which are they?
The straightforward definition of equality, based on Aristotle’s account, is that like persons should be treated alike, and unlike persons
should be treated differently in proportion to the difference between
them. The fundamental difficulty with this account is not that it is wrong
(as is often claimed) but that it is stated at too high a level of generality
to be useful. It provides no criteria to determine when a person is “like”
another, or even who should be compared to whom, and it provides no
criteria to assess the appropriateness of different treatments of those
who are not alike. Furthermore, the criteria cannot really be found in the
idea of equality by itself. The question of who should be punished by
the criminal law and what the appropriate punishment should be is a
question of criminal justice. Similarly, questions about the fairness of
entitlements or obligations to public education, public pensions, regulatory oversight, and so on, are difficult issues of public policy that are not
going to be answered by an abstract notion of equality. This has led
commentators to describe equality as an “empty idea”.1 It is empty in the
sense that it cannot be applied without first working out the criteria of
likeness and like treatment, and the idea of equality cannot by itself
supply those criteria.
The most common criticism of the Aristotelian idea of equality is
not that it is empty, but that it can mask discrimination that occurs indirectly rather than directly. An apparently neutral law may have a disproportionate effect on a particular group, which will claim that it has been
treated unequally. A law that prohibits women from serving in the police forces would directly discriminate against women. A law framed in
gender-neutral language that prohibits persons under six feet in height
from serving in the police forces would have the indirect effect of discriminating against women, because their generally lower height will

1

Peter Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537.
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cause them, disproportionately, to fail to meet the recruitment standard.
Everyone agrees that a theory of equality must cover the indirect as well
as the direct case.
It has never been clear to me that the Aristotelian idea of equality
was incapable of recognizing the indirect case. After all, the claim of the
equality-seeking group is that unlike cases are being treated alike by the
apparently neutral law. In any event, the conventional wisdom is that
“formal equality” (which is what is attributed to Aristotle) is “trivial,
even insulting”,2 because it does not capture indirect discrimination.
Robert Wintemute, writing about discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation, challenges the conventional wisdom. He points out that
“formal legal equality has tremendous material and symbolic value,
which only those who have been denied it for many years can fully
appreciate.”3 But, as Wintemute acknowledges, formal equality is not
enough. It is also necessary to guarantee “substantive equality”, meaning by that term a theory of equality that will capture indirect as well as
direct discrimination. Even when one moves from formal equality (prohibiting direct discrimination) to substantive equality (prohibiting indirect as well as direct discrimination),4 one is still left with the problem
that the idea of equality does not by itself supply the criteria for determining which distinctions (whether they be direct or indirect) are consistent with the idea of equality and which are not.
In the paper that follows, I trace the “winding course” of judicial interpretation of section 15.5 The Supreme Court of Canada has changed
the ground rules every few years as the judges have journeyed along that
winding course. It has been a serious problem for any commentator
foolish enough to try and keep a treatise on constitutional law up to date.

2

Robert Wintemute, “Sexual Orientation and the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 1143 at

1180.
3

Id.
I should note that academics are not agreed on precisely what is the difference between
formal and substantive equality: for discussion, see Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the
Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299; Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C. Faria, Emily Lawrence,
“What’s Law Good For: An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24
S.C.L.R. (2d) 103 at 105-108.
5
The same path has been traced by J. Hendry, “The Idea of Equality in Section 15 and its
Development” (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access to Justice 153; Debra M. McAllister, “Section 15—
The Unpredictability of the Law Test” (2003) 15 N.J.C.L. 35; Ryder et al., previous note. I am
indebted to all three accounts. I have also relied on my own account of equality: Peter W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Thomson Carswell), at c. 52.
4
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But it is well to remember the emptiness of the idea that section 15
constitutionalizes. It is not easy to apply a guarantee of equality.

III. EQUALITY BEFORE THE CHARTER
When section 15 came into force, Canadian courts were not entirely
unprepared to apply a guarantee of equality. The Canadian Bill of
Rights, which was a statutory bill of rights, and which applied only to
federal laws, contained a guarantee of “equality before the law”. In R. v.
Drybones (1969),6 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the Indian Act offence of being intoxicated off a reserve, because it
applied only to “Indians”, was invalid for conflict with the equality
guarantee of the Bill. In later cases, however, the Court decided that, if a
federal law pursued a “valid federal objective”, then its provisions could
not be attacked on equality grounds. This highly deferential approach
left Drybones as the only example of a conflict with the equality guarantee of the Bill.7 These cases were generally regarded as unsophisticated
and unduly deferential to Parliament, and did not provide good models
for a new jurisprudence under a constitutional bill of rights. Moreover,
much of the phraseology of section 15 (accounting for its verbose language) was specifically designed to negate various poorly considered
rulings under the Bill.8
The other body of law of which Canadian courts were aware (at
least dimly) was the jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the American Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was
adopted after the Civil War and the emancipation of the slaves, included
a guarantee of the “equal protection of the laws”. The American courts
had developed a doctrine of reasonable classification, under which a law
that drew a distinction that was reasonable in light of a legitimate purpose satisfied the guarantee. The Supreme Court of the United States
normally struck down racial classifications under this doctrine, Brown v.
Board of Education (1954)9 being the most famous example. But the
doctrine of reasonable classification was far from clear, and the “strict
scrutiny” that the Court applied to racial classifications was moderated
6
7
8
9

[1970] S.C.R. 282.
Hogg, supra, note 5, at sec. 52.2.
Id., at sec. 52.6(a).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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for other classifications, yielding a jurisprudence that did not give equal
protection very much work to do.10 As well, the history of slavery in the
United States culminating in the Civil War, and the persistence after
emancipation of official discrimination against African Americans,
provided a unique context for the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV. EQUALITY BEFORE ANDREWS
As related above, the Charter of Rights was adopted in 1982, and it
included section 15, although that particular guarantee did not come into
force until 1985. Section 15 provides:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because
of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.

The four different ways of describing equality (“equal before”, “equal
under”, “equal protection” and “equal benefit”) in section 15 are explained by earlier decisions under the Canadian Bill of Rights. In practice, nothing has turned on these various formulations, and they will not
be pursued in this paper. Nor has section 15(2) been given any independent force, since it has consistently been treated as a clarification of
the guarantee of substantive equality in section 15(1).11
What is actually prohibited by section 15 is “discrimination” and,
“in particular” discrimination “based on” the listed grounds of “race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability”. The words “in particular” made clear that the listed grounds
were not exhaustive. Did that mean that every legislative classification

10
11

citations.

Hogg, supra, note 5, at sec. 52.3.
Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 950 at para. 93, assembles the
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was potentially reviewable under section 15? At first, Canadian courts
answered “yes”, and Canadian lawyers rose to the challenge. Every law
could be attacked under section 15! The volume of cases was truly disturbing. A study prepared in 1988,12 only three years after the coming
into force of section 15, found 591 judicial decisions (two-thirds of
which were reported in full) in which a law had been challenged under
section 15. Most of the challenges seemed unmeritorious, and most of
the challenges were unsuccessful. But the absence of any clear standards
for the application of section 15 encouraged lawyers to keep trying to
use section 15 whenever a statutory distinction worked to the disadvantage of a client.
On the assumption that section 15 could potentially cover all legislative classifications, how did one determine which classifications were
in breach of the Charter? A variety of theories were proposed by courts
and commentators to answer that question. At one extreme, was the
theory, espoused by me in the second edition of my text,13 that every
distinction drawn in a statute counted as discrimination in breach of
section 15. The question whether it was justified or not would then have
to be determined under section 1. On this theory, the structure of analysis developed in R. v. Oakes (1986)14 for justification under section 1
(sufficiently important objective, rational connection to that objective,
minimum impairment and proportionality) would be the analysis that
would be applied to all section 15 challenges. The analogy was freedom
of expression, which is guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter; the
Supreme Court has defined “expression” so broadly that freedom of
expression cases are in practice all decided under section 1.
At the other end of the spectrum was the position taken by
McLachlin J. (now the Chief Justice of Canada) when she was a judge
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In the Andrews case (1986),15
which eventually went on to the Supreme Court of Canada, she held that
the only legislative distinctions that would amount to discrimination
were those that were “unreasonable or unfair”. On this theory, section

12

Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women (Can. Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Ottawa, 1989), at 277.
13
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed., (1985), at 799-801.
14
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
15
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1986] B.C.J No. 338, 27 D.L.R. (4th) 600,
at 610 (C.A.).
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15 contained its own implicit requirement of justification, and the question whether a legislative distinction was justified or not would be determined by an assessment of its reasonableness or unfairness according
to standards that the courts would have to develop within section 15
itself. Presumably, section 1 would play no role in section 15 cases since
section 1 justifies only “reasonable” limits on Charter rights. The analogy was “unreasonable search and seizure”, which is prohibited by section 8 of the Charter; the justificatory principle for search and seizure
provisions is embedded in section 8 itself.

V. THE REQUIREMENT OF LISTED OR ANALOGOUS GROUNDS
It was the theory that section 15 covered all legislative classifications that opened the floodgates to equality challenges. Whether justification was to be found in section 1 or within section 15 itself was not
likely to make much difference to the volume of cases coming before
the courts. What was needed was some threshold barrier that would
reduce the flow of cases to those where legislative distinctions were
presumptively suspect, and where judicial intervention was less likely to
disturb legitimate legislative line-drawing. In fact, section 15 did contain some clues to its scope that were missing from its counterparts in
the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The listed
grounds, although admittedly not exhaustive, did point to personal characteristics of individuals that cannot easily be changed and which have
often been the target of prejudice or stereotyping. The reference in subsection (2) (the affirmative action clause) to “disadvantaged individuals
or groups” suggested that the role of section 15 was to correct discrimination against disadvantaged individuals or groups. These features of
section 15 suggested that the proper role of section 15 was not to eliminate all unfairness from our laws, let alone all classifications that could
not be rationally defended, but rather to eliminate discrimination based
on immutable personal characteristics.
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989)16 was the first
section 15 case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. It was a challenge to the statutory requirement of the province of British Columbia
that members of the bar had to be citizens of Canada. The Court held

16

[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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unanimously that this requirement was contrary to section 15, and by a
majority that it was not saved by section 1. Justice McIntyre wrote for
the unanimous Court on the interpretation of section 15 (although he
ended up dissenting, because he thought the law should be upheld under
section 1). Justice McIntyre discussed and rejected the theories advanced by me (that section 15 condemned all legislative classifications)
and by McLachlin J. (that section 15 condemned unreasonable or unfair
classifications). He held that there was a “middle ground” between those
two positions, which was to interpret “discrimination” in section 15 as
applying to only the grounds listed in section 15 and “analogous”
grounds. This “enumerated and analogous grounds approach”, he said,
“most closely accords with the purposes of s. 15”, and “leaves questions
of justification to s. 1”.17 The Court went on to hold (with surprisingly
little discussion) that citizenship qualified as an analogous ground of
discrimination.
After Andrews, it was clear that section 15 was a prohibition of discrimination, and that discrimination was the imposition of a disadvantage (the imposition of a burden or the denial of a benefit)18 on an
individual by reason of the individual’s possession of a characteristic
listed in section 15 or analogous to those listed in section 15. This immediately ruled out judicial review of all statutes that did not employ a
listed or analogous classification. This was a severe reduction in the
scope of section 15, but one that could certainly be supported by the text
of the section. After Andrews, only L’Heureux-Dubé J., for a time, refused to accept the new doctrine. She advocated a more discretionary,
case-by-case, assessment of whether discrimination existed.19 No other
judge agreed with her, and she rejoined the other members of the Court
in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1999),20
in which the Court unanimously reaffirmed the restriction of section 15
to listed and analogous grounds. The Court in Law also added a new

17

Id., at 182.
In the world of equality, few matters are straightforward. The question of whether a
claimant has truly suffered a disadvantage is often difficult to determine, and the question of to
whom the claimant should be compared in order to determine disadvantage is also often difficult to
determine. These side issues will not be explored in this paper, although they have frequently
required Supreme Court rulings. They are addressed in Hogg, supra, note 5, at c. 52.
19
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at para. 90; Egan v. Canada,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 89.
20
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
18
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restriction, namely, that discrimination involved an impairment of “human dignity”. That element of section 15 is discussed later in this article. For present purposes, I simply note that the restriction to listed and
analogous grounds has persisted to the present day and is obviously a
permanent feature of the section 15 exegesis.

VI. THE ADDITION OF ANALOGOUS GROUNDS
Although the restriction to listed and analogous grounds was a severe reduction in the scope of section 15, it did leave room for analogous grounds to be enrolled as bases for findings of discrimination.
What are “analogous” grounds? Obviously, they are grounds that are
similar in some important way to the grounds listed in section 15, which
are “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability”. These are all personal characteristics of individuals that are unchangeable (or immutable), or at least unchangeable by
the individual except with great difficulty or cost. What is objectionable
about using such characteristics as legislative distinctions is that consequences should normally follow what people do rather than what they
are. It is not normally acceptable to impose a disadvantage on a person
by reason of a characteristic that is outside the person’s control. The
function of section 15 is to provide for judicial review of legislative
distinctions of that kind.
In Andrews itself, although the Court was unanimous that citizenship was an analogous ground, only La Forest J. attempted to grapple
with a definition. He pointed out that citizenship was a personal characteristic that is “typically not within the control of the individual and, in
this sense, is immutable.”21 This ruling was affirmed in Lavoie v. Canada (2002),22 where the issue was the validity of a statutory hiring preference for citizens in the federal public service. A majority of the Court,
which divided on issues of human dignity and section 1, upheld the
preference, but all members of the Court agreed that citizenship was an
analogous ground.
The second analogous ground to be recognized was marital status.
The recognition started in Miron v. Trudel (1995), which concerned the

21
22

Supra, note 16, at 195.
[2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769.
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statutory provision of accident benefits to a “spouse”, which was defined as a person legally married to the victim. Although the claimant
common-law spouse succeeded in striking down the requirement of
legal marriage, only four judges actually held that marital status was an
analogous ground. Four judges held that it was not. The fifth member of
the majority (L’Heureux Dubé J.) held that it did not matter.23 This was
less than a ringing endorsement of marital status as an analogous
ground, but, in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh (2002),24 the
Court (which included two of the judges who had dissented in Miron v.
Trudel) was unanimous that marital status was an analogous ground.
However, the majority of the Court held that the matrimonial property
regime of Nova Scotia, which was restricted to persons legally married,
did not breach section 15, because it did not impair the human dignity of
the common-law spouses despite their exclusion by reason of their marital status.
It is worth interpolating here that neither citizenship nor marital status has a strong claim to be an analogous ground, because neither is
immutable in any strong sense. Each is a status that can often be chosen
by the individual, although (as the Court has rightly emphasized) that
choice is sometimes blocked by legal requirements or (in the case of
marital status) by the contrary wish of another person. Indeed, the element of choice has been important in persuading the Court to uphold
legislative distinctions based on citizenship25 and marital status.26 It is
not surprising to find the requirement of dignity or the requirements of
section 1 defeating constitutional challenges based on either of these
analogous grounds.
The third analogous ground to be recognized was sexual orientation. In Egan v. Canada (1995),27 eight of nine judges decided that sexual orientation was an analogous ground. Justice La Forest, writing for
himself and three others, described sexual orientation as “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at
unacceptable personal costs.”28 For complicated reasons, the claimants, a

23
24
25
26
27
28

Supra, note 19.
[2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325.
Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769.
Nova Scotia v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325.
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
Id., at para. 5.
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same-sex couple who were seeking a spousal allowance under the federal Old Age Security program, did not actually succeed. But the ruling on
analogous grounds was clear enough, and it paved the way for a series
of cases that confirmed the ruling and upheld the equality rights of homosexual claimants. In Vriend v. Alberta (1998),29 the Court held that
Alberta’s human rights code violated section 15 by failing to include
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. In M. v. H.
(1999),30 the Court held that Ontario’s family law legislation violated
section 15 by excluding same-sex couples from spousal support obligations. In Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of
Justice) (2000),31 the Court held that the practices of customs officials in
obstructing the importation of books by a bookstore catering to gay and
lesbian communities was a breach of section 15. The Courts of Appeal
of British Columbia and Ontario and other provincial courts have held
that the opposite-sex requirement for marriage is contrary to section 15,
thereby legalizing same-sex marriage in several provinces.32 These
decisions also helped the Supreme Court to decide that the federal power over “marriage” extended to same-sex marriage,33 a ruling which was
followed by legislation enacting a new national definition of marriage
that no longer requires the couple to be of opposite sex.34
So far, these three grounds are the only ones that have been recognized. Place of residence has not been accepted as an analogous
ground,35 except in the special case of residence on an Indian reserve.36
Nor is occupation an analogous ground, so that a law denying collective
bargaining rights to police officers cannot be challenged under section

29

[1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
31
[2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120.
32
EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 994, 225 D.L.R.
(4th) 472 (C.A.); Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 2268, 225 D.L.R. (4th)
529 (C.A.).
33
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
34
Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33.
35
R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
36
Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203.
30
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15.37 And privileges for the Crown in litigation cannot be challenged,
because there is no distinction based on an analogous ground.38
Where there is no distinction based on an analogous ground, there is
no remedy under section 15. The Court, which of course created this
restriction, has chafed against it in some cases where the Court wanted
to grant a remedy. Malapportioned voting districts, which give rural
votes more weight than urban votes, have been held to be unconstitutional under the right to vote in section 3 of the Charter.39 This decision
allows place of residence to be a ground of unconstitutional discrimination where voting rights are involved. The exclusion of agricultural
workers from Ontario’s labour relations legislation has been held to be
unconstitutional under the right to freedom of association in section 2(d)
of the Charter.40 This decision allows occupation to be a ground of unconstitutional discrimination where freedom of association is involved.
When the Court imports equality values into other Charter rights,41 it
leaves out the restriction to listed and analogous grounds! (And it also
leaves out the requirement of an impairment of human dignity.)

VII. RECOGNITION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
Justice McIntyre in Andrews made clear that section 15 required
substantive and not merely formal equality. He rejected the “similarly
situated” test, which was the way in which formal equality had been
expressed in the past, pointing out that “identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality.”42 He acknowledged that equality is
a “comparative concept”, and the key to its application under section 15
was the prohibition of “discrimination”. He referred to cases under the
human rights codes and to the Abella report on equality in employment
to conclude that indirect (or systemic) inequality was covered along

37

Deslisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R.

989.
38

Rudolf Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 28, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695.
Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 158.
40
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.
41
See Peter W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation” (2003)
20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 113.
42
Supra, note 16, at 164.
39
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with direct inequality.43 Substantive equality—meaning that indirect as
well as direct discrimination was prohibited—has been a central assumption of the interpretation of section 15 to the present day.
The recognition of substantive equality has enormous symbolic significance for equality-seeking groups, such as women or visible minorities, who have generally achieved formal equality. It allows a court to
drill beneath the surface of the facially neutral law and identify adverse
effects on a class of persons distinguished by a listed or analogous personal characteristic. It is not necessary to show that the law was passed
with the intention of discriminating; the mere fact that the law does have
the disproportionately adverse effect is enough. Despite the commitment
of the Supreme Court of Canada to substantive equality, and despite the
industry of women’s groups and other equality-seeking groups in developing equality cases for litigation, only two claims of indirect discrimination have been successful.44 One is Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General) (1997),45 where the challenge was to the failure of
British Columbia’s statutory health care plan to provide publicly-funded
sign-language interpretation to deaf persons seeking medical services.
British Columbia’s law was neutral in that all persons were denied signlanguage interpretation, but of course the denial only disadvantaged deaf
people. The Court held that the law discriminated against deaf people in
breach of section 15. The other is Vriend v. Alberta (1998),46 where the
challenge was to the failure of Alberta’s human rights legislation to
include sexual orientation in the list of forbidden grounds of discrimination in employment. Alberta’s law was neutral in that the denial of a
remedy applied equally to those of heterosexual orientation47 as well as
to those of homosexual orientation. However, the disproportionate impact of the law was so obvious that the Court held that it discriminated
against those of homosexual orientation in breach of section 15.
43

Id., at 173-74.
Unsuccessful claims of indirect discrimination are Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (prohibition on assisted suicide not discrimination on the basis of physical disability); Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4
S.C.R. 695 (disallowance of child care costs as business expenses for income tax purposes not
discrimination on the basis of sex). Each of these cases divided the Court. However, the total
number of indirect discrimination claims reaching the Court is surprisingly small.
45
[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
46
Supra, note 29.
47
Discrimination on the ground of heterosexuality is rare, but not unknown, for example, in
the “gay kitchen” of a restaurant.
44
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VIII. THE AMBIGUITY IN ANDREWS’ DEFINITION OF
DISCRIMINATION
My reading of Andrews was that a breach of section 15 occurred
whenever a disadvantage (a burden or withheld benefit) was imposed on
the basis of a listed or analogous ground. That finding would exhaust
the role of section 15, and issues of the reasonableness or fairness of the
challenged law would be addressed under section 1. This elegant and
simple approach accorded appropriately distinct roles for section 15 and
section 1 in the equality inquiry. And who could doubt that the Oakes
principles of justification, so carefully developed to determine justification for breaches of all the other guarantees of the Charter, were just as
suitable to determine whether a classification based on a listed or analogous ground should be upheld?
This reading of Andrews meant that “discrimination” in section 15
had a very simple meaning. It meant the imposition of a disadvantage or
withholding of a benefit on the basis of a listed or analogous ground.
However, when I go back to Andrews to try and understand why this
understanding has not persisted in the later cases, I find that there is a
passage in McIntyre J.’s opinion that introduces a serious element of
uncertainty as to what he actually meant. After restricting the operation
of section 15 to listed and analogous grounds, he says that:48
However, in assessing whether a complainant’s rights have been
infringed under s. 15(1), it is not enough to focus only on the alleged
ground of discrimination and decide whether or not it is an enumerated
or analogous ground. The effect of the impugned distinction or
classification on the complainant must be considered. Once it is
accepted that not all distinctions and differentiations created by law
are discriminatory, then a role must be assigned to s. 15(1) which goes
beyond the mere recognition of a legal distinction. A complainant
under s. 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal
treatment before and under the law or that the law has a differential
impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but,
in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is
discriminatory.

48

Supra, note 16, at 182 (emphasis added).
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This difficult passage certainly leaves the impression that something
more than the breach of a listed or analogous ground is required to constitute discrimination under section 15. But it is accompanied by no hint
as to what that something more might be, other than the vague suggestion that it has to do with the “effect” or “impact” of the law.
The passage that I have quoted is then followed by McIntyre J.’s
ruling as to the relationship between section 15 and section 1:49
Where discrimination is found a breach of s. 15(1) has occurred and—
where s. 15(2) is not applicable—any justification, any consideration
of the reasonableness of the enactment; indeed any consideration of
factors that could justify the discrimination and support the
constitutionality of the impugned enactment would take place under
s. 1.

This passage makes clear that considerations of reasonableness or other
justificatory factors would be addressed under section 1. The implication is that such matters are not part of the definition of discrimination
in section 15, because, if they are, the clear demarcation between the
roles of section 15 and section 1 is destroyed.
My only point in picking away at McIntyre J.’s opinion in Andrews
is to show that there is some ambiguity and uncertainty as to whether he
intended his “enumerated and analogous grounds” approach to exhaust
the elements of “discrimination” in section 15. If discrimination is taken
to include other elements, then the meaning of section 15 becomes quite
unclear, and the respective roles of section 15 and section 1 become
confused. If, on the other hand, discrimination is taken to mean simply a
breach of a listed or analogous ground, then the meaning of section 15 is
clear, and the respective roles of section 15 and section 1 are also clear.
In the subsequent cases, these two views warred for supremacy, and
unfortunately the wrong side won.
In the Miron and Egan cases, decided in 1995, four of the nine
judges wanted to import into the section 15 analysis (through the definition of discrimination) the requirement that the legislative classification
not only be based on a listed or analogous ground, but also be “irrele-

49

Id.
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vant” to “the functional values of the legislation.”50 If the legislative
classification was relevant, then there was no discrimination. If there
was no discrimination, there was no breach of section 15, and no requirement for the government to justify under section 1 its use of a
listed or analogous ground as the basis for the imposition of a disadvantage. One can readily agree that the relevance of a legislative distinction to a legitimate legislative purpose is important in assessing whether
the distinction is justified or not. But an inquiry into relevance would
essentially duplicate the Oakes tests for section 1 justification.51 Of the
five other judges in Miron and Egan, four followed the orthodox route
of ignoring the ambiguity in Andrews. They held that a disadvantage
imposed on the basis of an analogous ground (marital status in Miron,
sexual orientation in Egan) was enough to constitute discrimination, and
immediately moved on to section 1 justification. One judge, L’HeureuxDubé J., took a different path entirely, rejecting the restriction of section
15 to listed and analogous grounds, and investigating discrimination on
a broader, more discretionary, case-by-case basis.
After Miron and Egan, which were decided in 1995, the Court was
splintered into three camps as to the interpretation of section 15. This
did not stop them from deciding some section 15 cases unanimously. In
Eaton,52 Benner,53 Eldridge54 and Vriend,55 decided between 1996 and
1998, the Court reached unanimous decisions,56 but made no attempt to
resolve the differences among the judges. It was not necessary, they
claimed,57 because in each case all three interpretations of section 15
would have led to the same result.

50

Supra, note 19, at para. 15 per Gonthier J. dissenting (with the agreement of Lamer
C.J.C., La Forest and Major JJ.); supra, at para. 13 per La Forest J. concurring (with the agreement
of Lamer C.J., Gonthier and Major JJ.).
51
In Miron v. Trudel, id., at paras. 31-38, Gonthier J. argues that the requirement of irrelevance in s. 15 would still leave s. 1 with some work to do. The argument depends on the point that
the “functional values” of the legislation are not the same as the objective of the legislation. This is
a highly refined distinction.
52
Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241,
paras. 62-65.
53
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] S.C.J. No. 26, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at
paras. 60-68.
54
Supra, note 45, at paras. 58-59.
55
Supra, note 26, at paras. 70-74.
56
In Vriend, id., Major J. dissented, but only on the issue of remedy, not s. 15.
57
In the previous notes, I have identified the passages where this claim is made.
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IX. THE REQUIREMENT OF AN IMPAIRMENT OF HUMAN DIGNITY
In Law v. Canada (1999),58 the Supreme Court of Canada surprised
observers by issuing a unanimous opinion, written by Iacobucci J., that
provided a new interpretation of section 15. The new interpretation
differed from each of the three of the competing interpretations that had
been offered in Miron and Egan. The new consensus was as follows:
(1) Section 15 applied only to legislative distinctions based on a listed
or analogous ground (contrary to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s earlier
view).
(2) Discrimination in section 15 involved an element additional to a
distinction based on a listed or analogous ground (contrary to four
judges’ earlier view).
(3) That additional element was an impairment of “human dignity” 59
(contrary to all nine judges’ earlier view).

The new requirement of an impairment of human dignity defeated
the claimant in Law. Under the federal Canada Pension Plan, survivors’
benefits were payable to the spouses of deceased contributors, unless the
spouse was under the age of 35, in which case the spouse was not entitled to survivors’ benefits. The claimant in Law was the survivor of a
deceased contributor, but, because she was under the age of 35, she was
ineligible for a survivor’s benefit. The law withheld a benefit from her
on the ground of her age, age being a listed ground under section 15. On
the simple interpretation of Andrews, that should have sent the issue on
to section 1, where the government would be required to satisfy the
Court that the age-based distinction was justified under the standards
established in Oakes. But, by adding the new requirement of human
dignity to section 15, the Court imposed on the claimant the burden of
establishing that the age-based distinction was an impairment of her
human dignity. She was unable to discharge that burden, and so her
equality claim was denied without recourse to section 1.
Why was the age-based distinction in Law not an impairment of
human dignity? The Court’s answer was that, in the context of the Canada Pension Plan’s purpose, it recognized the reality that young widows
58
59

Supra, note 20.
Id., at para. 88.
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and widowers would have less difficulty than older persons in finding
and maintaining employment after the death of a spouse, and would in
the long term be able to replace the lost income of the deceased spouse.
This is very close to saying that the age-based distinction was a reasonable restriction on access to CPP benefits. And yet, if one point was
clearly enunciated by McIntyre J. in Andrews, it was that, once discrimination was found under section 15, issues of reasonableness should be
left to section 1.60 This ruling would be nonsensical if only unreasonable
distinctions qualified as discrimination under section 15.
Justice Iacobucci in Law did not define “human dignity”. What he
did do was to suggest61 four “contextual factors” (which were not to be
taken as exhaustive) that were helpful to the inquiry. The factors were:
(1) the existence of pre-existing disadvantage; (2) any correspondence
between the distinction and the claimant’s characteristics or circumstances; (3) the existence of ameliorative purposes or effects on other
groups; and (4) the nature of the interest affected. In Law itself, it was
the second (“correspondence”) factor that was important. The age qualification for CPP survivor benefits corresponded to the actual characteristics and circumstances of youthful surviving spouses, who could more
readily find or maintain employment than older surviving spouses.
Since 1999, every case has followed the Law analysis, and looked
for an impairment of human dignity. Law has supplanted Andrews as the
leading case on section 15. This is unfortunate. The element of human
dignity that is now apparently firmly embedded in the jurisprudence is
vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants.62
Human dignity is vague. In the cases following Law, the Court has
often disagreed with lower courts and disagreed among itself on the
question whether the challenged law impairs the human dignity of the

60

Supra, note 49.
Supra, note 20, at para. 88.
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Commentators have been nearly unanimous in their criticism of the new element: e.g.,
Bev Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11 Const. Forum 65; Sheilah Martin,
“Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 31932; June Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11 Const. Forum 74; Christopher Bredt
and Adam Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for S. 15” (2003) 20
S.C.L.R. (2d) 33; Hogg, supra, note 5, at sec. 52.7(b); Debra M. McAllister, note 5, above, 105106. Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299,
315, agrees that there should be a third element to s. 15, but that it should be “protecting the interest
in belonging” rather than human dignity.
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claimant.63 As Debra McAllister has concluded (after a careful analysis
of the opinions on human dignity), the disagreements cannot be said to
be simply “a case of reasonable people disagreeing on the application of
a legal test”; rather, the disagreements show that the test has “very little
substance”.64 Considering that the validity of legislation turns on the
application of the test, this is a very serious criticism.
Human dignity is confusing. As an element of section 15, it is a reversion to the idea that was rejected in Andrews, namely, that section 15
should be restricted to unreasonable or unfair distinctions. As McIntyre
J. pointed out in Andrews, by introducing this kind of evaluative step
into section 15, the relationship between section 15 and section 1 is
confused, and it is not clear how much work section 1 is left to do.
Human dignity is burdensome to claimants. Any increase in the elements of section 15 has the undesirable effect of increasing the burden
on the claimant. The claimant must establish all elements of section 15.
This means that a failure to establish an impairment of human dignity is
fatal to the claimant’s case, which never advances to section 1. The
government must establish all elements of section 1. This means that, if
a disadvantage on a listed or analogous ground were enough to constitute discrimination under section 15, it would be for the government to
establish an important objective to the challenged law and proportional
means of carrying out the objective. This burden is not unreasonable,
since government is in a much better position than the claimant to adduce the necessary evidence. But the burden is removed from government if the claimant fails to persuade the Court of an impairment of
human dignity. Moreover, the inquiry into human dignity is highly unstructured compared with the section 1 inquiry. In particular, the court
does not need to make a finding of minimum impairment (or least drastic means), which under section 1 calls for an inquiry as to whether there
are alternative legislative measures that would accomplish the legislative purpose without impairing the right as much.

63
E.g., M. v. H., supra, note 30; Lavoie v. Canada, supra, note 22; Nova Scotia v. Walsh,
supra, note 23; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429;
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004]
S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
64
Supra, note 5, at 104. One might add that judges are not well suited to assess affronts to
the dignity of persons whose life experience may be very different from their own.
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In Law, the Court frankly acknowledged that it was imposing a new
burden on the claimant, and could only offer in reply65 that in some
cases it would not be necessary for the claimant “to adduce evidence”,
because it would be “evident on the basis of judicial notice and logical
reasoning” that human dignity had been impaired. The fact remains that
a failure to persuade the Court (in one fashion or another) that human
dignity is impaired causes the claimant to lose the case. As well as Law
itself, in many subsequent equality cases, the claimant has established a
disadvantage based on a listed or analogous ground, but has lost the case
for failure to also establish an impairment of human dignity.66

X. THE REQUIREMENT OF CORRESPONDENCE
As I explained in the previous s. of this article, in Law the Court
suggested four “contextual factors” that were to be taken into account in
determining whether or not human dignity is impaired by a law that
imposes a disadvantage on the basis of a listed or analogous ground.
The factor that was dispositive in that case was correspondence between
the challenged legislative distinction and the characteristics or circumstances of the claimant. The denial of CPP survivor benefits to spouses
under the age of 35 accurately corresponded to the circumstances of
younger spouses of deceased income-earners, who could be expected to
be more successful in finding and retaining employment than older
spouses. Therefore, the claimant, who was denied the spousal benefit on
the basis of her age, was unable to establish an impairment of her human
dignity and therefore lost her case.
Another age-based case was Gosselin v. Quebec (2002),67 where a
workfare program that provided low welfare benefits for persons under
30 unless they attended training programs was upheld. According to the
majority, the age-based requirement corresponded to the increased capability of young persons to benefit from training programs. According
to the minority, the imposition of hardship on young persons did not
65

Supra, note 20, at para. 88.
E.g., Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 625; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000]
S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703; Nova Scotia v. Walsh, supra, note 24; Gosselin v. Quebec
(Attorney General), supra, note 63; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 63; Ryder et al., supra, note 5, at 116-18.
67
Supra, note 63.
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respect them as full persons. The majority prevailed, of course, and the
claimant, who had subsisted with great difficulty on the low benefits
because she had been unable to access the training programs, was unable to establish an impairment of her human dignity and therefore lost
her case.
In Nova Scotia v. Walsh (2002),68 the exclusion of common-law
spouses from Nova Scotia’s community property regime was held, by a
divided Court, to correspond to real differences between common-law
relationships and legal marriages. In Canadian Foundation for Children,
Youth and the Law v. Canada (2004),69 the Criminal Code’s permission
for parents and teachers to use reasonable corrective force against children was held by a divided Court to correspond to the needs of children.
On the other hand, in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v.
Martin (2003),70 the Court held unanimously that Nova Scotia’s provision of short-term remedial programs, instead of full workers’ compensation benefits, for “chronic pain” did not correspond to the needs of
injured workers who suffered from that condition.
The correspondence factor has become the key to the impairment of
human dignity. From the cases so far, it appears to be the decisive factor
in determining whether there is an impairment of human dignity. 71 It is
the answer to that factor that yields the outcome, even if the other factors point in the other direction. What are we to make of this? On the
one hand, perhaps we should welcome a somewhat more specific test as
the proxy for human dignity—although the judges are usually divided
on the correspondence test. On the other hand, what does the correspondence factor really mean? Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, I suggest that the correspondence test, as it has been applied by the Court,
comes down to an assessment by the Court of the legitimacy of the
statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using a listed or analogous
ground to accomplish that purpose.72 If I am right, this leaves very little
work for section 1 to do.

68
69
70
71
72

equality.

Supra, note 24.
Supra, note 63.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504.
Ryder et al., supra, note 5, at 122.
Id., at 122-25, suggest that the correspondence factor is really a reversion for formal
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XI. THE ROLE OF SECTION 1 IN EQUALITY CASES
Since Law imported human dignity into section 15 in 1999, there
has been one case in which section 1 has saved a law found to be in
breach of section 15.73 In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.
(2004),74 the Court decided that Newfoundland, faced with a serious
financial crisis, could enact a law postponing the implementation of
collective agreements under which the government had undertaken to
increase the wages of female hospital workers in order to achieve pay
equity with men. The Court held that the law withheld a benefit on the
basis of a listed ground, namely, sex. The Court also held that it was a
breach of human dignity to maintain in force wages that did not do justice to the female workers’ contribution. Therefore, there was a breach
of section 15. But the Court accepted that in 1991, when the law was
enacted, the province had experienced a huge reduction in federal transfer payments, causing the province to make comparable cuts in expenditures, which it did by temporarily freezing the wages of all public sector
employees, laying off many employees and not filling vacant positions,
closing hospital beds, reducing medicare coverage, and freezing or reducing expenditures for education and other government programs. As
part of the response to this fiscal crisis, the postponement of Chartermandated expenditures was justified under section 1.75
The N.A.P.E. case is an unusual one. In the great majority of cases,
the new element of human dignity in section 15 leaves no role for section 1. It is obviously hard to justify a law that imposes a disadvantage
on the basis of a listed or analogous ground and also impairs human
dignity.76 If I am right that human dignity depends on the “correspondence” factor, and if I am right that that the Court uses this factor to decide whether the purpose of the law is legitimate and the use of a listed
or analogous ground to accomplish the purpose is reasonable, the close
73
In Lavoie v. Canada, supra, note 22, a majority of the Court upheld citizenship preferences for hiring into the federal public service. Four judges based their decision on s. 1. Two judges
based their decision on an absence of impairment of human dignity. Three judges dissented.
74
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381.
75
The Court made no mention of s. 28 of the Charter of Rights, which guarantees rights
“equally to male and female persons”, and which applies “notwithstanding anything in this Charter”. There had been speculation that s. 1 would not apply to sex equality, because of its notwithstanding clause.
76
This was the view of Bastarache J. (with the agreement of three others) in Lavoie v. Canada, supra, note 22.
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overlap between human dignity and section 1 becomes obvious. Not
surprisingly, with the exception of the N.A.P.E. case, section 1 has become unimportant in equality cases since the human dignity element
was introduced by the Court in 1999. As explained earlier in the article
(perhaps ad nauseum), the claimant often loses for failure to establish an
impairment of human dignity. Perhaps the same cases would be lost
under section 1 too. But at least section 1 is the subject of carefully
structured legal tests, and the burden of proving each step of the way
rests on government not the claimant.
At a rhetorical level, there is something insulting about telling the
unsuccessful equality claimant in a case like Law or Gosselin or Walsh
that her human dignity has not been impaired. This is a person who has
been disadvantaged by a legislative distinction based on her age or marital status (or some other listed or analogous ground), and who is so
upset by her treatment that she has gone to court to challenge the law.
Obviously, many equality-seeking claimants are going to lose their
cases, and obviously they will be unhappy, but the judicial rhetoric
about human dignity makes it look as though they were silly or even
neurotic to bother the courts with their problem. Would it not be more
compassionate to explain that a disadvantage imposed on the basis of a
listed or analogous ground is indeed discrimination in violation of section 15, but this particular law must be upheld because government was
able to prove that the law pursued an important purpose, and did so by
proportionate means? If we must talk about dignity, I say that is a much
more dignified way to lose than to be told that the law from which you
suffered never impaired your human dignity.

XII. CONCLUSION
The winding course of judicial interpretation may continue to wind.
For all the reasons provided in this paper, I hope it winds away from
Law and back to Andrews. However, all present indications are that Law
is here to stay, along with its much-maligned requirement of an impairment of human dignity.
The current state of the law on section 15 is that a claimant must
show “discrimination”, which has the following ingredients:
(1) The challenged law imposes (directly or indirectly) on the
claimant a disadvantage (in the form of a burden or withheld
benefit) in comparison to other comparable persons;
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(2) The disadvantage is based on a ground listed in or analogous to a
ground listed in section 15;
(3) The disadvantage also constitutes an impairment of the human
dignity of the claimant.

The claimant who persuades the Court of these three elements is entitled
to a finding of discrimination, which means that the challenged law is in
breach of section 15. The burden then shifts to government to justify the
discriminatory law under section 1. For reasons explained in the article,
section 1 justification is difficult, because the finding of an impairment
of human dignity will involve much of the same inquiry as that required
by section 1. However, in unusual cases, section 1 justification will still
uphold a discriminatory law.

